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Abstract
In a currency area, when a country faces a positive shock inflation goes up, real interest rate decreases and
competitiveness deteriorates. We show that the stability of equilibrium depends on the rationality of expectations
and budget balance of the public sector.
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1. Introduction
In a currency area, compensating the effect of an idiosyncratic shock on a member country by
adjusting the exchange rate is no longer an option. The literature recognizes several factors that may
take the role of exchange rate: factor mobility (Mundell, 1961), price/wage flexibility (Friedman, 1953;
Kawai, 1987), fiscal federalism (Kenen, 1969) and trade among member countries (McKinnon, 1963).
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The latter effect arises either from income or inflation rate differentials.3 In this note we concentrate on
the second effect. The conjecture is that such an effect stabilizes the economies in the currency area
because if a country experiences, say, a positive shock, its inflation goes up, decreasing the compe-
titiveness of this country and neutralizing the initial effect (Alesina et al., 2001, 18 19). We call this
the competitive effect.
However, when the rate of inflation goes up, the real interest rate decreases. This effect goes in the
opposite direction to the competitive effect because it stimulates the economy of the country that has
experienced the positive shock. We call this the real interest effect (this effect is the basis of the so-called
“Walters critique” to the EMS).
In this note we provide a simple model to study the working of both effects that bears some resemblance
to a model of Tobin (1975) for a closed economy. We assume two countries and that all relevant functions
are linear. We also assume that the only difference between countries is the size of potential output. Public
expenditure is, either constant or tuned in order to offset inflation. The central bank only cares about
maintaining a constant average inflation. We show that if the central bank attains its target, the nominal
interest rate is constant (Lemma 1).
We identify a range of parameters for which equilibrium is stable (Proposition 1). It turns out that
without an activist fiscal policy, these values are not very reasonable. In particular, expectations in
equilibrium cannot be rational. This is due to the fact that the competitive effect does not work if agents
anticipate correctly inflation because in this case supply becomes totally inelastic. Moreover, a country
receiving a positive shock has a rising inflation, but not necessarily a relatively high inflation.4
2. The model
Time is continuous. All variables are twice continuously differentiable with respect to time. A dot above
a variable represents its derivative with respect to time. Two dots indicate a second derivative.
There are two countries denoted by j 1,2. Let Yn
j be the potential income of country j. Let λ and 1 λ
be the relative size of the potential income of countries 1 and 2, i.e.
ð1 kÞYn1 kYn2 ð1Þ
Countries are identical except for the scale factor λ. The income of j, Y j, is the sum of consumption,
investment, public expenditure, G j, and net exports, S j. Investment is linear on the real interest rate, r j.
Consumption is linear on income net of taxes. Taxes are linear on income. Thus
Y j Fj Bjr
j þ CjS j þ DjG j ð2Þ
where Fj,Bj,Cj,DjN0. This is the usual IS curve. Taking units, D1 D2 1. Since countries are identical
except for the scale factor, C1 C2 C, and the relative impact of the interest rate on output equals the
3 The early literature focussed on price levels, not on inflation rates.
4 If inflation is rising in a country, eventually, it will catch up to the inflation in the other country. However, at this point,
potential output is different from real output (except in exceptional cases). Therefore the equality between inflation rates will not
persist, producing a cycle. See our comments at the end of Section 2.
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relative size of this country, (1 λ)B1 λB2. If i is the nominal interest rate and Πe
j the expected rate of
inflation of country j, i r j+Πe
j. Expectations are formed according to
P je aP
j bP
• j
ð3Þ
where aN0. Thus, if inflation rate is constant and a 1 we have perfect foresight. From Eq. (3) we get
Pe
• j
aP
• j
bP
•• j
.
The supply side is modelled by a Phillips curve with expectations, i.e.
Pj b¯jðY j Y jnÞ þP je ð4Þ
where b¯jub=Y
j
n.
Notice that β j (Yn
j Y j) Πe
j Π j (a 1)Πj bΠy j. Therefore if a≈1, bb0 is absurd because it
implies that when actual output is larger than potential output, inflation rate is decreasing. Thus, from now
on we assume bN0.
Net exports are assumed to be
S
•1
QLn
P2
P1
 a
where QN0, αN0 and P j is the price in j. Clearly, S1 S2. When prices are identical in both countries,
S1 0. Setting K Qα we obtain
S
•1
KðP2 P1Þ ð5Þ
The fiscal authority of each country implements a fiscal policy to stabilize the national economy such
that the variation in public expenditure is linear on the rate of change of inflation.5
G
•j
dj P
• j
ð6Þ
where δj≥0 and (1 λ)δ1 λδ2.
Finally, we assume that the central bank stabilizes weighted average inflation, Π, defined as
Π λΠ1 +(1 λ)Π2.
Lemma. If average inflation is constant, the nominal interest rate is constant.
Proof. Plugging Eqs. (2) and (4) in the definition of Π:
P¯ kfb¯1½F1 B1ði P1eÞ þ CS1 þ G1 Yn1  þP1eg
þ ð1 kÞfb¯2½F2 B2ði P2eÞ CS1 þ G2 Yn2  þP2eg
Differentiating with respect to time and rearranging:
i
• Pe
•1½kðb¯1B1 þ 1Þ þPe
•2½ð1 kÞðb¯2B2 þ 1Þ þ CS
•1½kb¯1 ð1 kÞb¯2 þ kb¯1G
•1þð1 kÞb¯2G
•2
kb¯1B1 þ ð1 kÞb¯2B2
5 For simplicity, we disregard boundary problems associated with the non-negativity of public expenditure.
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Using Eqs. (3), (5) and (6)
i
• P
•1
ak½b¯1ðB1 d1Þ b¯2ðB2 d2Þ P
••1
bkðb¯1B1 b¯2B2Þ þ K½P¯ P1=1 kC½kb¯1 ð1 kÞb¯2
kb¯1B1 þ ð1 kÞb¯2B2
Thus, under our assumptions, iy 0. □
From now on we assume that the central bank achieves its objective. Plugging Eqs. (2) and (3) in Eq.
(4), for j 1
P
•1ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þb P1½ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þa 1 þ b¯1ðF1 B1iþ CS1 þ G1 Yn1 Þ
Differentiating with respect to time using Eqs. (5), (6) and the definition of Π,
P
••1ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þb P
•1½ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þa b¯1d1 1 þ b¯1CK
ðP¯ P1Þ
1 k
ð7Þ
P
••2 k
1 k
P
••1 ð8Þ
If Eq. (7) is solved, Eq. (8) is solved too. Therefore let us solve Eq. (7).
Proposition 1. If ab1+β 1δ1/β 1B1+1 and the competitive effect is large enough, the trajectory of the
rate of inflation in country 1 is stable.
Proof. Eq. (7) can be written as P
••1 þd1P•1þd2P1 d2P¯; where
d1u ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þa 1 b¯1d1=ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þb
and
d2ub¯1CK=ðb¯1B1 þ 1Þbð1 kÞ
This is a differential equation whose particular integral is found by settingP
••1
P
•1
0. Eq. (7) implies
that at this point, Π1 Π. To obtain the trajectory we solve the quadratic equation z2 +d1z+d2 0, i.e.
z d1F
d21 4d2
2
r
The system is stable if both roots are negative. We have three cases.
1) If d1
2N4d2 the roots (z1, z2) are real numbers z1≠ z2. Stability requires d2b0. This condition never
holds because d2 is positive. Thus, the system is unstable and the inflation rate diverges from the
stationary equilibrium.
2) If d1
2 4d2, both roots take the same value, z1 z2 d1 /2. Stability requires d1N0; i:e:;
ab1þ b¯1d1=b¯1B1 þ 1.
3) If d1
2b4d2, both roots are imaginary. For this case to arise, the competitive effect (i.e. CK) has to be
large. In this circumstance the system describes a cyclic path. For equilibrium to be stable, i.e. for
diminishing amplitude in cycle, we need d1N0, i.e., ab1þ b¯1d1=b¯1B1 þ 1. □
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order to attain convergence. Notice that the definition of average inflation implies that under instability
two countries evolve in opposite directions: inflation increases in one country and decreases in the other.
3. Conclusion
In this note we have studied the effect of trade among country members on the stability of a currency
area. In our model a large competitive effect is necessary but not sufficient for convergence. In absence of
fiscal policy, stability also requires expectations not rational at the steady state (ab1). If this condition fails,
fiscal policy becomes necessary for convergence. Perhaps our model can shed light on the performance of
some economies of EMU in recent years, particularly Germany, France and Spain. Needless to say, the
robustness of our conclusions must be checked in more general models.
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